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THE WORD AND THE LAW
James Boyd White*
In this Article I shall first give a brief account of Milner Ball's
book, The Word and the Law,' saying something about the
interesting and important way in which it connects theology,
literature, and law. I shall then give a little more content to what
I say about this achievement by engaging in a kind of reading of two
texts, one theological and one literary, connecting both to the law.
I mean this reading simultaneously to be my own and to reflect
something of what I have learned from Milner. Another way to put
this is to say that I shall be trying to demonstrate what Milner does
by engaging in my own version of it-a version that I have to a large
degree learned from him.
I.
The Word and the Law is an extraordinary combination of law,
personal statement, literary criticism, and theology. In a sense its
central question is whether it is possible to have a life in the law
that is good, and the answer is yes-yes, though not at all easy. I
have often suggested it as reading to students who are worried
about the profession they have chosen, and they frequently return
to me with deep thanks for the introduction.
Milner's commitment throughout is not to abstraction or theory
or generalization, but to particular realities. Partly for this reason
he begins the book with a series ofvignettes 2-in a better world they
might have been profiles in The New Yorker magazine-of people
working in and through the law in ways that seem to Milner
fundamentally good. But the word "good" hardly does it; it would be
better to say that he sees these people as expressing, acting out of,
* Hart Wright Professor of Law, Professor of English, and Adjunct Professor of Classical
Studies, The University of Michigan.
1 MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993).
2 Id. at 7-72.
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and making real what he calls "the Word,"3 a complex term that is
central to his theological thinking and about which I will say a little
below.
The people about whom Milner writes in the first section of The
Word and the Law include a man working ceaselessly to end capital
punishment;4 the founder of a legal services office in Eastern
Kentucky;5 a woman who works as a judge in a New York City
housing court;6 a man, based in Oregon, who serves as tribal judge
in several Native American tribes;7 the head of the Indian Law
Resource Center in Washington, D.C.;' the Director of the clinical
program at Yale, who teaches law students how to represent the
dispossessed; and his partner in life, who works on the problems of
homelessness in New Haven.9 What makes these people remarkable
is not simply that they work on the side of the marginalized and the
oppressed, though they do, nor that they have achieved the results
in the world they wished to achieve, which they often have not, but
the way in which they do these things: with confidence, good
humor, attention to the particulars of the person and problem before
them, and real professional skill.
Milner treats these people as they tend to treat those with whom
they deal, with deep respect for the particularity of their lives and
personalities and situations in life, which he does much to capture
for his reader. But certain general themes do emerge, especially, as
I suggest above, the deep confidence these people have in
themselves and in the value of what they do. They all have it, even
though they all also recognize that they will not in fact change very
much the way the world runs. The evil against which they work is
a permanent part of the scene. But they are full of a sense of value
and meaning, which reflects itself particularly in their shared
disposition for warm and generous laughter. We do not really have
an adequate language with which to express what these people seem
3 Id. at 4.
4 Id. at 7-16.
5 Id. at 16-24.
6 Id. at 24-38.
7 Id. at 38-49.
8 Id. at 49-60.
9 Id. at 60-72.
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to share. Let us say, using Milner's central term, that in them we
can see the Word at work in the world.
These are lives in the law that hold out a promise to the rest of
us, including the students whom I send to this book and those of us
who teach as well.
How is this promise to be defined, explained, talked about
further? Maybe nothing more is required, but Milner wants to
connect his experience of these people with other aspects of life,
especially literature-Dilsey in William Faulkner's The Sound and
the Fury and Baby Suggs in Toni Morison's Beloved-and the
theology which is for him simply a necessary part of how he thinks.0
To start with Dilsey and Baby Suggs, these two African American
women, each abused and exploited, achieve contact with the truth
in a way that enables them," again in a highly particularized way,
to... to... to.. .- well, to do what, exactly?
How are we to talk about what these people of the law manage to
do, what these two women in literature manage to do? To use the
word "good," as I have done, hardly does it-the term is too vacuous
and moralistic. Yet to speak, say, of self-fulfillment, as our culture
invites us to do, misses the point entirely, for such a term makes it
sound as though the purpose of life is simply to please or satisfy the
impulses of the self-as if these achievements of spirit and
imagination are to be ranked with developing a good taste for wines
or furniture or clothes. How are we then to talk? This is the point
at which Milner is driven to use the language of theology,
troublesome though it may be to his readers and surely is to him.
What can we say, for example, about Dilsey's truthful, clear-eyed,
accepting, un-self-important willingness to meet the needs of those
around her? For Milner, what can best be said is that she performs
or enacts or expresses or serves the Word. Someone else with a
Christian commitment might speak of "serving the will of God" or
of "imitating Christ," but these phrases would be not much clearer
and for many people would be much more problematic than Milner's
laconic term.
'o Id. at 4.
" Id. at 73, 82, 90-91.
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Why do I say they would be more problematic? Partly, and
obviously, because these formulations would tend to exclude anyone
who was not a Christian, but I think that is not the worst of it. The
biggest problem is that these formulations would fit all too easily
into familiar patterns of dead and sentimental speech and thought
that would make it almost impossible for them to be used in a real
and vital way.12 Unless they were used by a master writer in a
composition that complicated and deepened their meaning, the
words quoted above would slide easily into the discourse of what
Milner, following Barth, calls "religion."13 By this term he means
the sentimentalization of faith or belief, and its institutionalization,
which is all too common and often in the service of terrible evil, such
as human slavery, racism, genocide, or war. 4
Milner's use of "the Word," as I see it, is his way of insisting upon
the life, the mystery, the opacity, of what he is trying to invoke, its
irreducibility to human terms. He is separating himself so far as he
can from the dead and sometimes murderous use of standard
formulations in the Christian tradition and its language. His word
for what he is trying to do is "theology"; his word for what he is
refusing to accept is "religion." He is as deeply opposed to much of
what "Christianity" has done and been as he is committed to the
revelations and imperatives at the heart of that tradition. He is not
anti-Christian, far from it; rather he is against the use of dead
formulas, clich6s, empty and self-righteous platitudes that are in his
view too much part of the world Christians have made, and in favor
of vital and authentic speech, faith, and action. It is this to which
he points with his use of "Word," which for him is a term not only of
Christian but of Jewish theology.'"
12 By "sentimental" I mean locutions that deny hard realities, including the realities of
our own ignorance and sinfulness, and maintain the pretense that life can be expressed and
managed by the manipulation of stock phrases.
'3 Id. at 75-82.
14 Id.
1 In Christian thought, "the Word" refers simultaneously to the sacred texts of the
tradition, to efforts to expound those texts, and to the source of all life and holiness that lies
behind and in those texts-and of whom John's Gospel says, "In the beginning was the Word."
John 1:1 (Authorized Version). In Jewish thought "the Word" is likely to invoke the Hebrew
word DVR, both noun and verb, and the Holy One who speaks that way.
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In insisting on the distinction between "religion" and "theology"
Milner is rejecting a general image of human life that dominates our
culture, namely that human felicity and flourishing are to be found
in the satisfaction of human desires, and the correlative idea that
the best life is that in which the maximum satisfaction can be found.
What he calls "religion" seeks to satisfy human desires in such a
way; what he calls "theology" seeks to understand and act in
accordance with "the Word." What Milner is determined to affirm
is the possibility that, despite our difficulties of understanding and
expression and thought, despite the limits imposed upon us by our
nature and our selfishness and our stupidity, it is sometimes
possible for a human being to act in accordance with the Word-or
perhaps to allow the Word to act through him or her.
II.
This is a bold and beautiful book. Milner's theology is full of
passion and maturity and difficulty. It is the opposite of a set of
comfortable and sentimental formulations, for Milner insists upon
directing the attention and the mind where they cannot wholly go,
upon what they cannot wholly understand. His formulations are not
meant to close off thought or investigation, but to provide an
opening for these activities. It is almost as though instead of saying
"the Word" he said "X," putting all of the responsibility upon the
reader to give it content. He does not quite do this, and he does
invoke texts from the Jewish and Christian traditions, which give
some content to what he means.16 But this content is difficult,
troublesome. Milner works in particular with one crucial passage
in the Gospel of Mark where Jesus explains a parable to the
disciples (the Parable of the Sower) 7 but makes clear at the same
time that he is deliberately not explaining it to the people at large,
and for a reason that is problematic to say the least: "so that they
16 BALL, supra note 1, at 102-28 (including Biblical passages from, inter alia, Mark,
Isaiah, Kings, and Deuteronomy).
17 Id. at 106-07; Mark 4:1-20 (English Standard) ("The Parable of the Sower.").
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may indeed see but not perceive, and may indeed hear, but not
understand, lest they should turn and be forgiven."18
How can this be? Jesus is keeping secret his explanations in
order to ensure that the people will not convert and be forgiven?
This has long been, for many Christians, a simply impossible text. 19
It turns out that the language that Jesus uses is a quotation from
a passage in Isaiah (translated into Greek first in the Septuagint,
then in Mark's text, then translated again for us into English),
which presents similar questions about the justice of the Deity.20 I
will not summarize Milner's treatment of these crucial texts beyond
saying that he does not seek to evade their difficulty, but to face it.
I think the best way into Milner's theology is not to think of it
conceptually, in terms of the doctrines or positions or claims or
arguments that he asserts, but to think of it as a way of life, or as
a ground of life. Milner is not telling us what he thinks, certainly
not asking us to think that too, so much as showing us how he lives,
or hopes to live. This is a theology that finds its expression in life,
not propositions. 2' And the kind of life that he performs or enacts
for us in this book is one that insists upon difficulty: the difficulty
of understanding texts, including sacred texts; the difficulty of
understanding the Word; the difficulty of expressing anything
valuable in the languages we have, all of which can decay into
sentimental clich6s and formulas-into "religion" or, in the law,
"legalism." He knows, and makes us see, that what he is pointing
to with the phrase, "the Word," cannot be fully and clearly expressed
in any human language, or grasped by any human mind; he makes
us see that the passages from Mark and Isaiah are not susceptible
to clear and convincing elucidation of any kind that will make their
problems go away; he makes us see that it is not just the identity of
18 Mark 4:12 (English Standard).
19 Including the writer of Matthew, who in a characteristic way softens what Jesus says
by changing the "so that" to "because." Matthew 13:13 (English Standard). In Matthew, that
is, Jesus is not trying to make the people blind and deaf, but simply recognizing that they are
not capable of understanding what he is saying. BALL, supra note 1, at 107.
20 BALL, supra note 1, at 108-09.
21 Of course no one can live without propositions of one kind or another. In theology one
must ask how to read the propositions of one's faith, how to connect them with one's own
experience, and how to utter propositions of one's own, whether direct reiterations from the
tradition or transformations of those expressions.
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the client or cause for which the lawyer acts that determines
whether she is acting on the side of death or of life, but the way in
which she does so-the tone and style and attitude, the openness of
mind, the capacity for trust, the insistence upon justice and
meaning.
I think the heart of what he sees, and makes us see, is the
responsibility that lies upon each of us, upon you and me, for what
we do and say under these difficult circumstances. We are not to
repeat in a mindless way the phrases used by others, even the
phrases used by Milner Ball, as if they carried force and life by
themselves. If we did that in the realm of the sacred, we would be
engaging in "religion" not theology; if we did that in the thinking
about statutes or judicial opinions, we would be engaging in
legalism not law; if we did that in the reading of literature, we
would be using, not reading, the texts. Rather, we are to become
what he is, a writer, an imaginer, a speaker; one who can bring
together texts and questions from law, theology, literature, and the
rest of life. We have to face in our way what he shows himself
facing in his.
III.
How are we to discharge that responsibility? Milner's answer lies
not in any instructions, but in his own performance. I will not try
to parse or explain what he does, with literature, law, or theology.
But in what follows I do want to say something more in particular
about his theology, which is I think the center of this book and the
ground of what it achieves. I cannot avoid it, nor do I want to do
that.
It is very difficult to talk about this subject, or in this vein, as
Milner himself makes clear. My way of doing this, as I said at the
outset, will be to try to show something of what I think Milner
means in a performance of my own, in which I will necessarily at the
same time be building on what he has done. With this as my aim,
let me try to give what I mean to be a Milner-like reading of a couple
of texts, one a sacred text from the tradition to which both he and I
belong, the other quite different, a modern rewriting of an ancient
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literary text. In the process I shall try to say something about law
as well.
A.
The first text I have in mind, to which I shall give fairly extended
treatment, is a moment in chapter six of the Gospel of John in which
Jesus seems to be deliberately leading his disciples into confusion
and uncertainty,22 as a result of which many of them simply leave
his company, apparently for ever.23 In its own way this is as
puzzling as the passage from Mark referred to above, in which Jesus
is said to be keeping his message and his meaning secret from the
people.24
What precipitates the moment in chapter six is Jesus's sudden
and radical intensification of an image that he has repeatedly been
using to describe himself and what he offers the world-an image of
himself as a kind of food or drink, or nourishment. Earlier in John's
Gospel, for example, he says to a Samaritan woman he meets at a
well that those who drink from the water that he gives will never
thirst again.25  Of course he is not talking about physical
water-water from a special flask he has by his side or anything like
that-but is using the image of water to talk about his gift of life to
the spirit. Later he feeds 5,000 people who have come to hear him,
using two loaves and five fish which miraculously multiply to feed
everyone. This time Jesus is providing physical food, fish and bread,
but this is surely meant to represent spiritual food as well.26 Then,
in a series of speeches to his disciples and others, Jesus says,
several times, that he is the "bread of life," bringing life eternal.2
This image is familiar and natural to those raised in Christianity,
but in its context it is deeply challenging. The comparison Jesus has
in mind, as he makes plain, is with the Exodus story in which the
22 See John 6:22-59 (English Standard) ("I am the bread of life... unless you eat the
flesh of the son of man and drink his blood, you have no life in you.").
23 John 6:66 (English Standard).
2 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
25 John 4:14 (English Standard).
26 John 6:1-5 (English Standard).
2 John 6:22, 35, 48.
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people of Israel were fed by manna from heaven during their sojourn
in the desert.28 Jesus is saying that he is bread from heaven, like
manna; but he is a new and better kind of manna, bringing not just
earthly food but eternal life. Those who eat his "bread"-whatever
he means by that-will live forever, unlike their ancestors who ate
the manna that kept them alive in the wilderness, but were
ultimately to die ordinary deaths. Jesus is thus making a claim that
must be deeply shocking to his Jewish audience-and all of his
audience was Jewish-namely to surpass the great act of divine
grace by which the God of Israel fed the chosen people when they
were starving in the wilderness. Jesus is saying that he offers more
than the God of Israel did at one of the greatest moments in history;
at the same time, he makes plain that his offer is not just to the
chosen people, but to all people-to whoever eats of the bread of life.
This must be very hard for his audience to understand and accept.
This is difficult enough, but Jesus's image of feeding now
intensifies in a way that is bound to make his audience even less
comfortable. He shifts from bread and water to flesh and blood,
saying that unless you eat of the flesh of the son of man and drink
his blood there is no life in you; but if you do these things, you have
eternal life.29
What can he mean by this weird and apparently cannibalistic
language? To modern Christians the image of eating the body and
drinking the blood is of course familiar, because it is the basis of the
Eucharist, where the bread and wine are said in some way either to
be or to represent the body and blood of Christ. But Jesus's
disciples have heard nothing of the Eucharist, and John has told us
nothing on the subject. In fact his Gospel will never tell the story of
the Eucharist. Obviously the first readers of John, and today's
readers too, have heard of the Eucharist and can read Jesus as
foreshadowing it; but that does not change the fact that this
language is simply not intelligible to the disciples, his immediate





In fact the disciples not surprisingly rebel at what Jesus is
saying. "This is a hard saying; who can listen to it?" they ask.3"
This is a highly understandable response. Aside from the simple
weirdness of the image to one who knows nothing of the Eucharist,
Jewish law explicitly prohibits the drinking of blood as unclean, and
this must make the figure of speech deeply offensive to his
audience-including of course his disciples.
So the disciples' confusion makes good sense. Yet when Jesus
responds to them he does not do so as the friendly, loving, and
helpful presence he is sometimes imagined to be (especially in what
Milner would call "religion"). He does not really explain or clarify
what he means, or try to make it easier. In fact, in a way that
reminds me more than a little of the passage from Mark, he makes
it harder: If what I have just said offends you, he says, how do you
think you would respond if you saw the Son of Man ascending in the
sky to the heaven from which he came?"' This reference to the
Ascension-which has of course not occurred nor so far as we know
been predicted, and which is by any measure a strange thing to
imagine-must be puzzling in the extreme." Then, shifting his
subject rapidly, he says: My words offer you spirit and life, but I
know that some of you do not believe.33 This means, given what he
has earlier said, that some of his disciples will not have eternal life.
Tough news indeed, and again puzzling in the extreme-and
certainly different from the sentimentalized Jesus of much religious
instruction. Then he says, No one comes to me unless it is granted
by the Father 3 -suggesting perhaps that God is a kind of gate-
keeper to salvation, with the result that we cannot on our own
choose to believe, or to accept his teaching. If that is true, does it
mean that some of us are just doomed to death without our fault,
others given the gift of eternal life? How can that possibly be just?
This too raises disturbing possibilities.
30 John 6:60 (English Standard).
31 John 6:61-62.
32 There was one precedent, the ascension of Elijah to heaven, which might give Jesus's
remark some familiarity to his audience. 2 Kings 2:11. To the extent Jesus was invoking that
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Jesus has identified a whole set of extremely difficult issues-the
meaning of eating the flesh and drinking the blood; the nature of
eternal life; the mystery of the Ascension; the persistence of disbelief
even among his friends; the possibility of predestination and hence
divine injustice-issues that have troubled the theologically minded
for the past two thousand years and are still with us today. No one
has solved any of them. But Jesus dumps all of them on his
disciples, who are in no way prepared or equipped even to identify
the issues, let alone think about them.
These difficulties are in a real sense beyond the capacities both
of his disciples and of those of us today for whom this is a sacred
text, certainly beyond our rational analysis. I know that I cannot
fully explain, even to myself, the justice of God; the nature of the
Ascension; exactly what happens at the Eucharist; or what Jesus
means when he speaks here of eating the flesh and drinking the
blood of the Son of Man. We live in contact with realities and
experiences we cannot manage with our minds.
This is perhaps the main thing that Jesus in this passage is
trying to teach the disciples, saying to them something like this: Of
course you balk at what I have just said about eating the flesh and
drinking the blood. But there will be much more to balk at before
you are through. Life with me, my way of living, cannot be reduced
to logical coherence, to human language, to human understanding.
You will always live in the edge of understanding, in the presence of
that which you cannot reduce to human terms.
What Jesus is not so much telling his disciples in this passage as
making them experience directly, is that what he offers can never
be rendered wholly intelligible in a rational or propositional way.
To live the life to which he is inviting them is to live with the
unknowable, the inexpressible, that which is beyond language and
the mind. This is the opposite of the vice that Milner calls
"religion," which typically, in the Christian context at least, involves
the reiteration of linguistic formulas, doctrinal propositions, credal
statements, as though the expressions told the truth
nonproblematically.
This experience pushes off on to the individual disciple the
responsibility for speech and action in the context it defines. You
must yourself decide what you are to say and do; you must decide
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whether or not you can live with the inexpressible without, the
inexpressible within, and the difficulties such a life presents. In all
of this you are not of course alone: you have the sacred texts, the
church both as institution and as community, and the presence of
what I might call the Spirit, and Milner the Word. But as the
passage from John makes plain, your own responsibility is not to be
evaded by recourse to any of these things.
What Milner calls "theology" is a way of continuing to inhabit the
space Jesus here defines and creates. The task is not to answer the
questions he poses, but to learn how to live with them. Those who
do so are called to a certain kind of existence, highly problematic in
nature, with no guarantee of success.
B.
I wish now, like Milner, to turn to the law, seen not simply as a
set of rules or as a system of institutions but as a life, an activity of
mind and imagination, and ask what I take to be Milner's question:
What connection can there be between the kind of theology he does,
as represented in his book, and in my own efforts just above, and the
law, especially the practice of law?
Obviously law, like theology, is inherently neither better nor
worse than any other life, but better or worse only as we make it so.
Law can be dreadful, marked by thought and expression that is
rigid, dead, authoritarian, sentimental, the equivalent of what
Milner calls "religion." Or it can be... what exactly? Can it be in
Milner's terms a place for the Word to live?
First, let us think of the way language works in legal texts. Some
people, and some part of ourselves, want to claim that these texts
have fixed and clear meanings; that any difficulties in interpretation
are trivial in kind; that the phrase from the statute book or judicial
opinion somehow says it all. But most lawyers learn that this
simply will not work, a discovery that is forced upon them by the
brutal fact that their authorities will not perfectly cohere. The
inherent uncertainty in language creates an unavoidable openness
to contrasting readings that cannot be avoided and that can be
ignored only at one's peril. This openness creates possibilities for
[Vol. 41:923934
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newness of thought and imagination-for the life of what Milner
calls the Word.
There are powerful forces in the law that resist the disposition of
the law to become a closed and authoritarian system. The first is
the simple fact that in the usual case there are lawyers on both
sides, each of whom is under a constant pressure to open up
possibilities of meaning that a casual or lazy reading would miss or
slide over. The statute may seem to favor the defendant, but the
plaintiff has every incentive to test that reading in every way he
can-by exploring the possible linguistic meanings of the crucial
words and phrases and by reading the particular provision in its
larger contexts: in light of the larger statutory scheme, or against
the common law background it was meant to modify, or by analogy
with other statutory and judicial authorities (from one's own
jurisdiction or others), or by the invocation of the structural values
that underlie the law and find only implicit expression on its
surface. Of course he or she will also examine other statutes that
may conflict with this one, or supersede it, and other constitutional
provisions, state and federal, and other principles of common law or
rules of practice. While it is of course true that some rules will be
too plain and certain for argument, in any real case the hunt is
perpetually on for those rules, or other texts, that afford an opening
for argument.
A second source of the energy that keeps legal interpretation
open is the fact that it is our convention-and maybe a convention
necessary in any system that claims to be law-that in every case
the requirements of law and those of justice must be seen to
coincide. As a practical matter it would be very difficult for a lawyer
to confess that a statute is unjust but claim that it must nonetheless
be applied, just as it would be difficult to confess that the only
proper construction of a statute is adverse to his client but claim
that it must be disregarded nonetheless because it is unjust. Each
lawyer must argue that both law and justice are on his side, in
essential harmony." In every case there is thus a potential
" Of course the lawyers on the two sides of a case will have competing understandings
of what justice requires, just as they will have competing interpretations of the law. There
is no clear definition of justice to which both (or either) can unproblematically appeal. But
2007] 935
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
redefinition both of law and justice and the relation between them,
which opens the discourse in ways that cannot be predicted or
controlled. And once the argument begins it cannot be reduced to a
merely technical affair, for it raises issues and doubts and
difficulties that cannot be cabined and confined.
In addition, the lawyer must face the fact, familiar to the
theologian, that he deals with experience that his language cannot
wholly express, and must do so in connection with other languages
which it can neither completely dominate nor completely ignore.
For what brings the parties into conflict is often an experience-an
injury, a betrayal, a loss, a hope-that cannot in fact be wholly
expressed in any language. In the course of trial, it is always a
possibility that the law will find itself poised against another
language, another body of knowledge-engineering or medicine or
accountancy or sociology or psychology-that cannot simply be
translated into legal terms but has its own meaning, its own
authority, with which the lawyers and judges will have to find a way
of coming to terms. The law must deal with what it cannot express,
in relation both to the original human experience and to other forms
of thought and discourse.
The surprising openness of the law to thought and invention and
newness creates for the lawyers simultaneously a set of difficulties,
a set of opportunities, and a set of responsibilities. For the law must
be reinvented, over and over again, in case after case. This makes
it possible for the lawyer to have a sense, seen in many of those
whom Milner describes at the beginning of his book, that in working
hard in the law, on case after case, detail after detail, one is,
without quite knowing how, marking out points on a trajectory that
will have a significance that one at the time can only dimly grasp;
and perhaps another sense too, that in these moments at which one
faces the inexpressible reality of other people's experience, the
problematic meanings of the law, and the impossible task of defining
what justice means, there are flashes of significance, of power, of
grace, that redefine life itself. The responsibility of the lawyer, and
his joy, is to live with the difficulties at the heart of law, at the heart
just as the meaning of the law is a necessary topic of the lawyer's argument so is the meaning
of justice, in general or in this case.
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ofjustice, difficulties that can never be resolved, will never go away,
but which he must address nonetheless. In all of this it is rather
like theology, as both Milner and the author of John define it.
Of course law can be terrible. It can be used for evil ends, for
torture and slavery and the oppression of the poor. It can be part of
what Simone Weil calls the empire of force.36 It can become a tissue
of sentimental slogans, of cliches, of formulations that trivialize and
dehumanize our fellow human beings and us too. But so, as Milner
argues, can theology, including Christian theology. The
responsibility to see that law and theology are not used in this
fashion lies upon us, and this responsibility is so similar in the two
fields as nearly to unite them.
There is this to add, which I express here as a matter of faith.
My own belief is that when law is used in the way I describe in the
preceding paragraph, it loses its character as law. When our law
was used to maintain the hideous system of racial slavery upon
which so much of the nation's life and economy was so shamefully
founded, it lost its essential nature, for it became subject to the
control of a single value, that of slavery, which always prevailed
when it conflicted with any other. Instead of being a system of
thought and expression in which conflicts are recognized, and faced,
and dealt with, it became an almost perfectly authoritarian and
empty system, totalitarian in nature, unable to open itself to
argument based upon the larger purposes and character of the law,
upon analogies among the various parts of law and to the larger
culture, upon claims of justice-upon whatever can happen when
established ways of stating the truth are challenged.3" Similarly
today the use of the forms of law to justify the torture of those whom
some government officials suspect of crime, or perhaps merely of
criminal disposition or association, in my view threatens the very
existence of law as we have known it. Indeed I think this practice
36 Here is what she says: "No one can love and be just who does not understand the
empire of force and know how not to respect it." Simone Weil, "L'Iliade, ou le pobme de la
force," first published in Les Cahiers du Sud (December 1940-January 1941). SIMONE WEIL,
OEUVRES 528 (Florence de Lussy ed. 1999). In French the sentence reads: "Il n'est possible
d'aimer et d'&tre juste que si l'on connait l'empire de la force et si l'on sait ne pas le respecter."
Id. at 551. The translation given above is my own.




is so obviously evil and so obviously gratuitous that it must be the
true purpose of those who propose "legalized" torture to destroy law
itself, and with it the law's power to control government.
For me-and I know here I may be far from what Milner would
say-the center of both law and theology is the fact that in each we
constantly face the moment of speech, the moment of thought, at
which we may find ourselves replicating dead and toxic forms of
expression or may, instead, find new and vital ways to speak. The
latter is always possible, and always our responsibility, in both
fields; and in both it is in a sense always enough to be a servant of
life, to seek living speech and what it can offer, even if in the
particular moment one loses, or is ignored or forgotten or killed.
Both law and theology are in this sense based upon fidelity to the
possibility of the moment, the openness of the world to new life, new
expressions of the truth.
C.
I want to close with a brief account of another work, certainly
literary and legal, and perhaps theological too, that I think of
extraordinary interest and importance. I have in mind the version
of Sophocles' Antigone composed by Francois Ost, professor of law
and Vice-Rector of the University of St. Louis in Brussels.38 I
include it here as a way of affirming one of Milner's major points as
a Christian theologian: that just as there may be activities that are
styled "religious" and "Christian" but in which the Word is not
present or respected, so too there may be activities that are wholly
secular in appearance, or the product of a radically different
religious tradition, in which the Word is present and alive. How to
determine whether either of these is the case, or not, is for Milner
a central responsibility of the faithful life.
Entitled Antigone Voilge (in English, Antigone Veiled), Professor
Ost's play locates the Antigone story in a modern European country
which is francophone with a substantial Muslim population-France
or Belgium or Anycountry. The setting of the events is a highly
selective public secondary school, in which Ayisha, the Antigone-
38 FRANCoIs OST, ANTIGONE VOILgE (2004).
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figure, and both of her brothers, Nordin and Hassan, and her sister,
Yasmina, are students. The two brothers are killed by an explosion
of an object apparently in their possession, Nordin immediately,
Hassan after a period in the hospital. As the Director of the School
sees the facts, this is the fault of Nordin, in his mind a terrorist,
who must have been carrying a bomb; Hassan, the good citizen,
must have been struggling with him to prevent the use of the bomb
when it went off.
The brothers are of course direct parallels to the two brothers of
Sophocles' Antigone who die in battle for the control of Thebes. One
of these, Eteocles, is thought by Creon, their uncle and now by
default the ruler of Thebes, to be the good one, dying for the city; the
other, Polyneices, is on his view the bad one, attacking the city and
seeking to overthrow the government. Eteocles, Creon declares, is
to be honored with a public burial; Polyneices is to be thrown out of
the city, to be devoured by dogs and birds. Creon announces that it
will be a crime punishable by death to provide his body with the
protection of religious "burial," which can be achieved simply by
sprinkling dust on the body. This is the decree that Antigone
disobeys, an act that leads ultimately to her death. 9
In Antigone Voilge, the major parallel to the burial is attendance
at funeral services for Nordin, which the Director prohibits to any
student, including Ayisha, who begins to wear the hijab, or veil, in
protest. When she is threatened with punishment, she enters upon
a fast, from which she ultimately dies. Much of this play, as of
Sophocles' play as well, is taken up with arguments among the
various actors as to the rightness of the decree in question and of
the refusal to obey it. In Ost's play the characters include members
of what we would call the board of trustees, including their chair,
teachers, a couple of news reporters, as well as the primary
antagonists, Ayisha and the Director.
I will not rehearse the arguments except to say that there is
surface plausibility in many of them, on both sides. The idea that
9 Creon's version of the story omits the fact, deep in the tradition, that Eteocles and
Polyneices, were supposed to share the rule of Thebes in alternate years, and that Polyneices




the school should prevent its students from wearing insignia that
would divide them on religious lines has of course power, as does the
fear that the funeral may become a kind of political theater,
challenging the regime of the school. And it would challenge not
only the regime of the school but its central educational function.
For the mission of a French school, much clearer than its American
counterpart, is to produce citizens who share French culture in a
deep and vital way. On the other hand, students are allowed to
wear crosses and yamulkes, and small items that indicate belief in
Islam, so why not the veil? And the factual assumptions upon which
the Director is proceeding, namely that Nordin is a terrorist and
Hassan a good citizen, are wholly unproven.
As in the original Antigone, and as in a good law case too, the
arguments not only answer each other, they open up new lines of
thought and action. Ayisha starts off being offended by one thing,
the prohibition on attending the funeral of her brother, but becomes
much more deeply offended by the gradually emerging structures of
thought and feeling that underlie that prohibition. This leads to her
own theater, of self-starvation.
One beauty of this play is that it brings the mainstream reader
or audience to see this conflict, of course a widespread one in
Europe, and soon perhaps here, from the point of view of the
Muslim, who is seen by the official world as a threat and whose
willingness to act on her beliefs, even in purely symbolic ways, is
seen as an offense and a danger.
One line of questioning to which Ayisha is subjected, and which
lives for the audience as well, is exactly why it is so important for
her to wear the veil. Here we naturally want to think legalistically,
in terms of rules and sanctions. Does the Qu'ran require it? Upon
the threat of what sanctions for disobedience? Or is this just her
"personal" idea of what she should do? Or is it really a "cultural" or
"political" rather than a "religious" symbol? And what of the
argument that the prohibition of the veil is meant to protect the
individual girl or young woman from the dehumanizing control of
others, especially men, against her own will or preference? If the
school permits her to wear the veil, the thought is, she may be
required to do so by her community, sometimes under the threat of
rape or other forms of violence if she does not. And in any case will
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the affiliation she is enacting in wearing the veil, even if in some
sense voluntary, prevent her from achieving a condition of autonomy
that will permit her to make the authentic choices upon which our
idea of democracy and civilization depend? All this means that the
value of the young woman's autonomy is arguably on both sides of
the question, not just one. As these arguments and others too are
advanced by the various speakers, we come to see how complex and
difficult the issue is, especially when regarded not as a matter of law
or theory, but of life and action.
We cannot fully evaluate these arguments for we do not know
what we think we know, namely what Islam is-or what different
versions of it exist; or what the meaning of the veil is, or the range
of meanings, to Ayisha, to other Muslims, to the world. In this
sense these arguments are a call to us to do the work necessary to
reaching a right judgment.
But what is a "right judgment"? Think here of Ayisha's own
judgment: it is not simply that she insists on wearing the veil that
matters, or the persuasiveness of the arguments she makes on her
own behalf; it is how she does these things, and who she is in doing
so. Some of the arguments advanced against her by time-servers
and bullies and administrative cowards have real force (or would
have force if they were advanced by others, in another way); the
arguments are cogent in themselves, but in the nature of things
inconclusive; in the end it is who the proponents are that matters,
how they make the arguments they do, and in these respects many
of them are contemptible. In a way that may remind one of Milner's
understanding of the Word, and of the good lawyers described in his
book, the most important questions of human life cannot be reduced
to proposition or program or outcome, but lie in the world of
character and meaning. Others could do what Ayisha did and be
plainly wrong, and the same is true of our own most significant
moral judgments: what determines quality at the deepest level is
who one is, the meanings one lives by, the way one acts in the world.
So how does the play end? The Director realizes something of
what he has done, and is ashamed and guilt-ridden. Yasmina,
speaking with authority here, compares this situation with that of
her father-Oedipus-when he confronted the Sphinx. He thought
2007]
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he knew more than the Sphinx, Yasmina says. The Director,
somewhat puzzled, says he has never seen the Sphinx.
"She was there however, but you didn't see her," says Yasmina.
"You asked questions and made answers. But you didn't think there
really were questions. You saw only the answers. You were
encumbered with certainties. Answers are easy. All they take is
patience and work. But questions are risky. You walk the tightrope
above the void, without a safety net. Every step is a disequilibrium.
One must believe in the next step, inventing the path as one goes."
The Director asks her if he should resign. Yasmine goes on:
"You still don't understand. Someone else in your place would
not have done better than you. It is not a question of being Director
or not. It has solely to do with knowing how to listen, how to hear
the questions that are posed."
The Director asks whether Nordin is one of the faces of the
Sphinx, and Yasmina says: "Yes, and Hassan also."
"And Ayisha?" he asks. "Not she," she replies. "The veil perhaps.
You must understand this veil was not a screen, but an enigma. It
was not a rejection, rather an appeal, an open question."
"And you?"
Yasmina says, "I have had enough of the questions of others."
The Director turns at the end to thoughts of his son Eric, fearing
that he has done something irreparable. Yasmina says, "Certain
people are condemned to live. I know something about that."
"What could I ever say to him?"
"There always comes," says Yasmina, "a moment at which you
are asked what has been your question. You will have much time
now for thinking about your question."
I have no idea whether Professor Ost would think of himself as
having theological interests or concerns, but he is a lawyer, and his
vision of law, and life, seems to me to bear a deep similarity to that
of Milner. It is how one lives with the unknown and unknowable,
the decisions one makes and the risks one takes, that matters. Life
is a series of questions, including the questions this play puts to us,
including the questions Milner raises, including the questions Jesus
puts to his disciples in the passage from John. No easy or familiar
answer is possible, in law, theology, or life itself. This is true for
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Ayisha and Yasmina, true for the lawyer who feels and accepts the
extraordinary responsibilities of his position and his calling, and
true for those who read the Jewish or Christian Scriptures, and I
assume the Islamic texts as well, in a way that acknowledges their
opacity and difficulty and recognizes the hope they make real.
